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According to the promises to the World Trade Organization（WTO）in that year, 
China has already opened its banking industry on December 11th, 2006. It is implied 
that the RMB business was allowed to be developed by the foreign banks and 
internal and the external banks were really on the same scratch line from then on. 
This was significant to the China’s financial system which was dominated by the 
banking industry. In order to cope with the foreign banks as seasoned competitors, a 
broad debate about the banking industry reform was ever spread out in academia and 
banking industry. However, there is not any verdict to this problem up to now. 
Property right reform and market structure reform, which one should be emphasized 
particularly on? And which is the optimized way to reform our banking industry. 
With the financial system opened step by step, a great changes must happened to the 
asset scale, risk management, market structure and property right structure of our 
banking. The core of all the changes is the performance. To this, Industrial 
Economics must offer an academic explanation and policy advice. 
Based on the characteristic of banking industry in the transformation period in 
China, we analysis how the factors influenced the performance of banking industry. 
Due to our special history, China’s stated-owned banks have ever played very 
important roles in our economy. So we will emphasize the reform of stated-owned 
banks more than the joint-stock banks. Detailedly to say, what we have done in this 
paper is basing on the review of vested reform path, combining with the facts and 
drawing the conclusion by deduction. 
The conclusions we draw in this paper are (1)As far as the stabilization and 
performance of our financial system were concerned, the optimum market structure 
is oligarch competitive market. (2)That the property right was monopolized by the 
government is the root of our banking industry’s inefficiency, and the motivation of 
property right reform. (3)To improve the banking industry’s performance, the 
government should spare no effort to construct an honesty oriented society.  
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1 导  论 
 1
1 导  论 
1.1 问题的提出 











1.1.1 S-C-P 框架对银行业的不适用性 
    由梅森（Mason）、贝恩（Bain）等哈佛学派学者创立的结构主义分析框架




                                                        
① 2005 年 10 月 中国银联对各大银行下发《关于收取品牌服务费、对跨境跨行查询交易收费以及调整跨
境取现交易手续费标准的函》。计划 2006 年 1 月 1日起，银联卡跨行查询开始收取手续费，其中境内查询
单笔手续费为人民币 0．15 元。各界对此议论纷纷，这一决定遂被推迟执行。2006 年 5 月 18 日 四大国
有商业银行开始在网点发布收费公告，将于 6月 1日起开始收取跨行查询费，境内跨行查询每笔手续费
0.3 元。 
② 从中国建设银行宣布自 2005 年 9 月 21 日起，对日均存款低于 500 元人民币的个人活期存款账户按照每
季度 3元进行收费到中国农业银行宣布自 2006 年 9 月 21 日起，各分行按照新制定的统一标准收取小额账
户服务费，四大国有商业银行已经开始全面实施小额存款收费制度。 





















    但是，市场结构与市场绩效之间是否一定存在因果关系？如果一个行业销
售额集中在少数几家企业手中，能证明就一定存在经济上的低绩效吗？ 
    我们不妨先来看看经典 SCP 范式的逻辑推演，如表（1）所示 
 
表 1：SCP 范式的逻辑推演过程① 
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